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Abstract 
 
Since the EU’s Helsinki decision in 1999 to officially admit Turkey 
as a candidate country, Turkey’s territorial governance has been 
increasingly challenged towards a more regionalised model. This 
article offers an analysis of the causes and mechanisms which act 
upon the development of regional governance in Turkey during the 
EU pre-accession process. Based on interviews conducted during 
Summer and Autumn of 2003, this article argues that it is the inter-
action between state norms, ideas about regional economic devel-
opment and EU conditionality which constitute the main causes of 
domestic stability and change in Turkey’s regional governance. 
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1.   Introduction 
 
The Helsinki summit of EU leaders in 1999 when Turkey was offi-
cially admitted as a candidate country to join the EU marks a sig-
nificant increase in the influence of the EU on domestic political 
and  economic  change  in  Turkey.  Whereas,  previously  the  EU-
Turkey  Customs  Union  failed  to  induce  major  transformation  in 
Turkey (Öni￿, 2003), the decision of the Helsinki summit provided 
Turkey with concrete possibility of EU membership, triggering a 
process of major domestic change.  
 
The aim of this paper is to examine Turkey’s regional governance 
and  to  identify  causes  and  mechanisms,  which  are  conducive  to 
bring  about  change  or  maintain  stability  during  the  EU  pre-
accession process. The pre-accession process is a relatively recent 
phenomenon  in  Turkey’s  case,  with  the  Accession  Partnership 
document drawn up as late as the end of the year 2000. Therefore, it 
is  too  early  to  fully  explain  domestic  change,  particularly  in  re-
gional governance, an area which has lagged behind political re-
forms  in  importance.  Nevertheless,  changes  have  taken  place  in 
Turkey’s regional governance in recent years and based on these 
changes it is possible to draw tentative conclusions about the way in 
which institutional change/stability is sustained.  
 
It has become fashionable in academic literature to use the concept 
of ‘Europeanisation’ in order to understand the impact of the Euro-
pean integration on domestic change not only in member states but 
also in candidate countries
1. Even though the concept of ‘Europe-
anisation’ may have different meanings, it is most often used to re-
fer to domestic institutional and policy adaptation to the pressures 
emanating from the EU (Olsen, 2002). Similarly, studies on Turkey 
about the domestic impact of EU conditionality have proliferated 
following the Helsinki decision. These studies have mostly tended 
to focus on democracy, human rights, state-society relations in gen-
eral and foreign policy
2. However, there has not been significant re-
search on the more subtle influence of EU conditionality towards 
                                                 
1   See, inter alia, Börzel and Risse (2003), Radaelli (2000), Grabbe (2001), 
Cowles et al. (2001). 
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increased regionalisation through the adaptation of regional policy 
and development of regional governance in Turkey. 
 
One of the most important policy fields in the EU is regional and 
cohesion policy, whose objective is not only to achieve economic 
and social cohesion within the EU but also territorial cohesion fol-
lowing the inclusion of the latter objective in the new European 
Constitution.  The  effective  implementation  of  these  policies  re-
quires that local and regional governance systems in member states 
are compatible with EU practice and regulatory norms. The main 
aim of EU regional policy is the reduction of regional disparities be-
tween the different regions in the EU territory.  
 
The scale of regional disparities between the different parts of Tur-
key  is  wider  than  the  scale  of  regional  disparities  in  the  EU.  In 
terms of geographical size Turkey encompasses an area bigger than 
that of Germany, Italy and Portugal combined, with a population of 
approaching seventy million. According to the State Planning Or-
ganisation (SPO) of Turkey the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per 
capita in 2001 was highest in the three regions in the Western and 
Northwestern parts of Turkey, which were up to 150 per cent of 
Turkey’s average income. The GDP per capita in the poorest three 
regions of Turkey in the Eastern and Southeastern parts of Turkey, 
however, accounted for only 40 per cent of Turkey’s average in-
come. 
 
Despite these regional disparities, Turkey has not experienced de-
centralisation or devolution to the regional level, as has been the 
case in most of the countries of the EU. Theorists from a range of 
disciplines, as Schobben (2000) shows, tend to share the view of the 
growing importance of regions. It has been observed that a trend 
across many parts of Europe in the last decade has been an emer-
gence of a regional level of government or a process of decentrali-
sation  and  regionalisation  (Keating,  1998;  Bachtler,  1997;  Bull-
mann, 1996; Nanetti, 1996). 
 
In contrast, Turkey’s territorial governance consists of a central and 
a local level, with the absence of institutional structures for an in-
termediate level between the two. The only exception to the absence 
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Administration specifically set up for the Southeast Anatolia region 
of Turkey. Territorial governance of Turkey has been increasingly 
challenged  following  the  Helsinki  decision  by  the  EU’s  specific 
conditions in this area. 
 
Even though, there is a huge research literature on regional and lo-
cal governance in Western Europe in the context of the broad con-
cept of ‘Europe of the Regions’, and growing research on the Euro-
peanisation  of  regional  governance  in  the  accession  countries  of 
Central and Eastern Europe, the lack of research on institutional ca-
pacity at the regional level in the case of Turkey is striking. There-
fore, another aim of this paper is to contribute towards filling the 
gap in research literature on regional governance in Turkey. 
 
In the remainder of the paper, the theoretical approach is summa-
rised followed by a comparison of the EU’s and Turkey’s regional 
policy. Based on interviews three main causal variables are identi-
fied to explain the reasons for stability and change in Turkey’s re-
gional  governance.  This  is  followed  by  an  analysis  of  possible 
mechanisms  of  institutional  change  during  the  EU  pre-accession 
process. 
 
 
2.   Theoretical Framework 
 
In recent years there has been an increased interest in the analysis of 
institutions in studying European integration and EU governance as 
can be seen in the works of Bulmer (1994, 1997) or Pierson (1996). 
In examining regional governance in Turkey, Historical Institution-
alism provides useful conceptual tools for analysis because of its 
focus on the institutions of the state (Lecours, 2000: 513; Hall and 
Taylor, 1996: 938; Thelen and Steinmo, 1995). This is important for 
two reasons. Firstly, it has been shown that the emergence of a re-
gional level of governance in Western Europe for the most part was 
a project of the nation-state, i.e. it emanated from ‘above’, rather 
than  ‘below’  (MacLeod,  2001;  MacLeod  and  Goodwin,  1999; Loewendahl-Ertugal: Europeanisation of Regional Policy & Governance  22 
Brenner, 1999)
3. Secondly, the state has played a dominant role in 
society and economy throughout the Ottoman and Turkish history. 
 
Historical Institutionalism draws attention to three major explana-
tory variables in its analysis of institutions. One of these variables 
concerns institutional norms. Institutions are defined as comprising 
not only formal organisations and informal rules, but also norms, 
values or beliefs embedded in institutions (Hall and Taylor, 1996; 
Bulmer, 1994, 1997; Pierson, 1996). Defined as such, political insti-
tutions  may  shape  identities,  interests,  and  actions  of  actors 
(Katznelson, 1997). 
 
The second explanatory variable in the analysis of institutions con-
cerns the role ideas play in policy-making (Hall, 1995). The concept 
of ideas may range from political programmes to visions of what is 
good and they may alter the identities and interests of actors (Hall 
and Taylor, 1998). Hay and Wincott (1998) stress that perceptions 
of what is feasible, legitimate, possible and desirable are shaped 
both by the institutional environment and by existing policy para-
digms and worldviews. For example, New Regionalism is a world-
view or policy paradigm (Thomas, 2000) that has been very influen-
tial in the formulation of new approaches to regional development 
in national and international frameworks, including the European 
Union
4.  New  Regionalism  encompasses  several  different  theories 
advocating  transfer  of  powers  to  the  regional  level  in  order  to 
achieve regional economic development and competitiveness
5.  
 
The third explanatory variable concerns the role played by external 
forces in the analysis of institutions (Steinmo et al., 1995; Hall and 
Taylor, 1996; Lecours, 2000). External forces may be in the form of 
international economic structures and requirements of EU member-
ship. Global economic liberalisation and the associated processes of 
competition, co-operation, and innovation are major external forces 
heightening the regional agenda. The European Union has been a 
                                                 
3   See Webb and Collis (2000) and Syrett and Silva (2001) for an account of the 
establishment of Regional Development Agencies in England and in Portugal, 
respectively, from this point of view. 
4    See, for example, CEC (1993a) and OECD (1996). 
5   See, inter alia, Scott and Storper (2003), Amin (1999), Cooke and Morgan 
(1998). Loewendahl-Ertugal: Europeanisation of Regional Policy & Governance  23 
key advocate of economic liberalisation among its members and as-
sociated countries, including Turkey, which has had a fundamental 
impact on regions across Europe. Similarly, the requirements of EU 
membership  in  the  area  of  regional  policy  have  potentially  far-
reaching implications for regional governance. 
 
In  addition  to  explanatory  variables,  Historical  Institutionalism 
elaborates  various  mechanisms  of  institutional  change.  Thelen 
(1999: 397) argues that “institutions rest on a set of ideational and 
material foundations that, if shaken, open possibilities for change”. 
In this view, to understand institutional change, it is necessary first 
to identify the ideational and material foundations of institutions, 
which constitute the “mechanism of reproduction”.  
 
Lindner  (2003:  917-8)  identifies  four  reproduction  mechanisms. 
The first concerns the power of the dominant actor coalition where 
institutional stability is ensured by a strong coalition of actors that 
benefit  from  the  existing  institutional  arrangements.  The  second 
mechanism is where institutional stability is based on the interde-
pendence  of  different  policy  sub-fields,  each  dominated  by  en-
trenched interest. In this case the intervention of a higher-level au-
thority, which is hierarchically superior, can overrule entrenched in-
terests. The third mechanism concerns large switching costs where 
the cost of change may be too high. One way of change in this case 
occurs when the opportunity costs of continuing the status-quo in-
crease. The fourth mechanism is where small institutional adapta-
tion can meet the demands for change. However, change becomes 
inevitable  when  small  adaptations  no  longer  suffice  to  meet  de-
mands. 
 
In understanding Turkey’s regional governance, explanatory vari-
ables and mechanisms of institutional change, to which the Histori-
cal Institutionalism literature draws attention, will be applied. 
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3.   Regional  Governance  in  Turkey:  Comparison  of  Turkey 
and EU Regional Policy 
 
EU’s conditions in the area of regional policy require both policy 
and institutional changes, which point to a certain model of regional 
governance. 
Table 1. Comparison of regional policy in Turkey and the EU  
 
Criteria for 
comparison 
 
Turkey Regional  
Policy 
 
 
EU Regional  
Policy 
 
 
Remarks  
 
Partnership  
 
No tradition; non-existence 
of regional agencies in 
most cases, especially at 
the NUTS 2 level 
 
Different practice 
 
A draft law for 
establishing 
RDAs at 
NUTS2 level  
Programming  
 
No tradition except for 
GAP region; but recently 
some progress under EU 
influence 
 
Already the third 
generation of pro-
gramming docu-
ments 
 
Excessive em-
phasis on 
analysis in re-
gional plans, 
weak strategic 
component 
Concentration  Weak  
 
Focus on the most 
needy 
 
 
Implementation 
structure  
Prevailing sectoral ap-
proach  
Different systems    
Approach  to 
regional policy 
Narrow conception of re-
gional policy and its insuf-
ficient coordination with 
other policies 
Integrated multi-
sectoral approach  
Attempts to-
wards an inte-
grated ap-
proach in GAP 
Selection of 
projects 
 
Problems with transpar-
ency, no separation of 
functions 
 
Clear separation 
of management, 
monitoring and 
control function 
 
 
 
Evaluation of 
efficiency and 
effectiveness 
 
Weak tradition, performed 
infrequently and ad hoc  
 
Systematic atten-
tion and pressure 
for further en-
hancement 
 
 
 
Involvement of 
private sector 
 
Low participation for 
preparation and limited 
awareness of regional pol-
icy 
 
Strong role, often 
significant initia-
tive 
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Therefore, it is useful to establish the discrepancies between Turkey 
and EU regional policy through a comparative analysis. The follow-
ing criteria, which were used in comparing regional policies in the 
accession  countries  of  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  to  the  EU 
(Davey, 2003), can also be used to evaluate Turkey’s regional pol-
icy. These criteria include major principles governing EU regional 
policy (see Table 1). 
 
3.1   Partnership 
 
The first criterion for comparison is the principle of partnership, 
which  was  introduced  by  the  1988  reform  of  the  EU  Structural 
Funds. Partnership calls for close involvement of regional and local 
bodies with the Community and the national authorities in the plan-
ning, decision-making, and implementation of the Structural Funds 
(CEC, 1988). Whereas previously national governments alone had 
controlled  the  implementation  process,  with  the  1988  reform  the 
sub-national level of governance plays a formal role in the admini-
stration of programmes within member states.  In the 1993 reform 
of Structural Funds, the partnership principle was extended to in-
clude an array of non-state actors (CEC, 1993b: 19).  
 
The partnership principle in the implementation of Structural Funds 
have led scholars to depict the EU governance system as “multi-
level governance” to refer to a structure whereby there are horizon-
tal and vertical linkages among sub-state and non-governmental ac-
tors (Risse-Kappen, 1996: 60; Marks et al., 1996: 346). According 
to this model the sovereign nation-state does not constitute the sole 
focal point for decision-making competencies, which are shared by 
actors at different levels (i.e. the EU and the regional level). As 
Bullmann (1996: 17) points out traditionally unitary nation-states 
now have to think seriously about regionalisation to keep pace with 
European-level developments.  
 
There is weak tradition of partnership in Turkey. Under the terms of 
its Constitution, Turkey is a unitary and centralised country. Terri-
torial administrative units (provinces and districts) have very lim-
ited powers: their functions have been until present essentially ex-
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real  regional  structures  for  handling  power.  Three  types  of  local 
government exist: provinces, municipalities and metropolitan areas, 
in addition to village administrations. Turkey therefore does not at 
present possess any official regional subdivision, with the exception 
of the delineation of statistical regions in 2002 as part of prepara-
tions to join the EU. Moreover, the recent public administration re-
form bill, which still has to be approved by the Turkish Parliament, 
does not address the lack of institutional capacity at the regional 
level. The lack of regional administrative structures reduces the po-
tential application of the principle of partnership within the country. 
 
The formulation of regional policies and regional planning is en-
trusted to the SPO in the central administration. Involvement of the 
local or regional level in the preparation of regional policies by the 
SPO does not take place in the centralised governance system of 
Turkey. There have been limited attempts at regional planning for 
particular regions in the past, most of which could not be imple-
mented due to lack of administrative structures for implementation, 
such  as  the  regional  plans  for  Antalya,  Çukurova  region  or 
Zonguldak region.   
  
3.2   Programming 
 
The principle of programming was also introduced as part of 1988 
reform of EU Structural Funds. Before, most funding had gone to 
individual projects. This approach was replaced by the requirement 
that projects had to form part of larger multi-annual programmes for 
each  assisted  region.  This  aimed  to  encourage  a  more  coherent, 
long-term approach to regional development. 
 
In Turkey there is no tradition of programming for regions with the 
exception of GAP. Regional plans, to the extent that they existed, 
composed  of  individual  project  proposals.  There  are  annual  pro-
grammes for national investments prepared by the SPO, however, 
they are not always realised due to macroeconomic imbalances. It 
was reported by the Economic and Social Committee of the EU 
(ECOSOC, 2003) that one of the most important premises of the 
European regional policy has not been taken into account in Turkey, 
that is the very tight link between the programming activity and the 
preliminary  drafting  of  the  budget:  this  exposes  high  uncertainty Loewendahl-Ertugal: Europeanisation of Regional Policy & Governance  27 
concerning the availability of resources to be invested, and the same 
programming exercise becomes even more difficult. 
 
3.3   Concentration 
 
The principle of concentration in the EU involves the concentration 
of spending on the most needy regions and states. In the EU’s 2000-
2006 programming period three priority objective areas are identi-
fied. Some fifty regions, home to 22 per cent of the EU15' s popula-
tion, are included within Objective 1 status, whose development is 
lagging behind, and they receive 70 per cent of the funding avail-
able.  
 
In Turkey the share of resources within the country seems not to 
have been always directed to reduce internal disparities. The prior-
ity goal of national industrialisation remained the determining factor 
in national development plans. In fact, the economic inefficiency 
involved in investing in under-developed regions was accepted only 
in the initial years of the Republic because of the pressing need for 
national unity. “Without such an overwhelming concern, it is highly 
doubtful that the Government would have made the sacrifices in 
economic  efficiency  that  were  required  by  the  Turkish  territorial 
development policy” (cf. Danielson and Kele￿, 1985: 211). 
 
Regional projects, formulated since 1960s, were for East Marmara, 
Antalya, Çukurova, Zonguldak and Keban regions, most of which 
were  relatively  prosperous.  Various  state  mechanisms  transferred 
resources from small rural municipalities to big urban municipali-
ties (Güler, 1998: 163). In 1975 the province of Istanbul alone ac-
counted for 49 per cent of all major industrial establishments in the 
country. By the end of 1970s Istanbul received 40.5 per cent of fi-
nancial and physical incentives (Güler, 1998: 228). In 1980, 60 per 
cent of all public credits were allocated to the most developed re-
gions in the west, while Eastern Anatolia received only 4 per cent 
(Danielson and Kele￿, 1985: 35). 
 
In 1993, there were thirty five provinces within the status of Priority 
Development Areas, a key tool of regional policy, which included 
some provinces in the West as well. They had a population of 16.1 
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Despite  that,  the  Priority  Development  Area  provinces  received 
15.7 per cent of public investments in 1991, 12.4 per cent in 1992 
and 17.8 per cent in 1993
6. In contrast, provinces in the Marmara 
and Aegean regions attracted more than 50 per cent of public in-
vestments throughout the period due to their superior port, infra-
structure  and  agricultural  conditions  and  better  social  institutions 
(Da￿, 1995: 41). 
 
3.4   Implementation structure 
 
In terms of the implementation structure, traditionally there have 
been two major tools of regional policy in Turkey: public invest-
ments and incentives to the private sector. Public investments have 
been implemented by the relevant agencies of the central admini-
stration, which have narrowly defined functional duties, such as the 
Highways Authority or the State Hydraulic Works. Incentives have 
been  implemented  mainly  by  three  development  banks  and  two 
half-investment half-commercial banks (Ziraat and Halk). 
 
As regards to the implementation of regional plans, in addition to 
fundamental technical, budgetary and legal deficiencies, there are 
also problems with the administrative organisation and power vac-
uums.  The  problems  of  implementation  continue  to  show  them-
selves at various levels (Dülger, 2001: 22-3): 
 
·  Institutional organisation for implementation of plans at the 
national level is very weak; 
·  There  is  no  legal  arrangement  and  division  of  labour  be-
tween the central and sub-central administrations about the 
implementation of regional plans; 
·  The duties of provinces in the implementation of plans are 
not evident; 
·  There is a need for “regional development institution mod-
els” responsible for the management of regional plan/project 
implementation in the regions and a need to re-define the di-
                                                 
6   See SPO, accessible at: http://www.dpt.gov.tr  Loewendahl-Ertugal: Europeanisation of Regional Policy & Governance  29 
vision of powers between the central, regional and local lev-
els. 
·  Co-operation processes between the implementing agencies 
of the central and sub-central administrations are required. 
Moreover, ways of incorporating co-operation between re-
gional and local officials, NGOs and private entrepreneur-
ship into regional planning processes have to be worked out. 
 
 
3.5   Approach to regional policy 
 
In terms of its approach to regional policy, Turkey' s efforts in less 
developed  areas  have  been  designed  more  to  meet  production-
related (sectoral) requirements rather than those of comprehensive 
and,  most  importantly,  territorially  integrated  development 
(ECOSOC, 2003). 
 
The traditional planning method in Turkey is sectoral and central-
ised  (Dericio￿lu,  1989:  110).  In  the  sectoral  planning  approach, 
plans are made to encourage the growth of certain sectors without 
any consideration of regional or sub-regional dimensions and with-
out making any links between different territorial spaces. The incen-
tives scheme was thus oriented towards businesses that would con-
tribute to sectoral targets rather than on the basis of encouraging 
development in the least developed regions (Da￿, 1995: 147). 
 
The Five Year National Development Plans aim to direct invest-
ments at the economic and sectoral levels, without any considera-
tion  for  regional  distribution  (Turkey  Development  Bank,  2002: 
33). These national plans predominantly focus on economic meas-
ures and city plans at the local level have a physical character, nei-
ther of which are suitable for tackling regional disparities (Turkey 
Development Bank, 2002).   
 
The only exception to the sectoral approach has been the Southeast-
ern Anatolia Project (GAP), which in 1989 signalled a transition 
from  one-centre  one-sector  planning  practice  to  two-centres  (na-
tional and regional) and multi-sector planning approach. However, 
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were made available disproportionately in favour of energy invest-
ments, at the expense of other sectors (80 per cent realisation in en-
ergy sector investments as opposed to 18 per cent realisation in irri-
gation  as  of  2002).  Moreover,  the  GAP  Regional  Development 
Administration, established to implement GAP, has been headquar-
tered in the capital Ankara, with only a directorate based in the re-
gion. 
 
3.6   Selection  of  projects,  Evaluation  of  Efficiency  and  Effec-
tiveness and Involvement of the Private Sector 
 
Whereas there is clear separation of management, monitoring and 
control function in the selection of projects in EU regional policy, 
there has been no transparency in the selection of projects in Turkey 
and  no  separation  of  functions. In  contrast to  the  importance  at-
tached to efficiency and effectiveness in the EU regional policy, 
Turkey has a weak tradition with infrequent and ad hoc application. 
 
The role the private sector has played in regional projects has been 
very limited in Turkey, especially in the least developed regions as 
against the EU where the private sector plays a strong role. How-
ever, there is an increasing emphasis on the need the encourage pri-
vate sector involvement in regional projects under the influence of 
the EU, World Bank and the IMF and in the face of dwindling re-
sources and macroeconomic imbalances. 
 
3.7   EU Conditions 
 
The EU Commission has formulated a supranational uniform model 
of regional governance as part of its conditionalities of enlargement 
since 1997. The conditions imposed by the EU promote a new func-
tionalist Brussels model for the reconfiguration of the territorial di-
mension  of  governance  (Hughes  et  al.,  2000).  The  Commission 
identified ‘regional administrative capacity’ as a core requirement. 
An efficient system of public administration at regional and local 
levels is seen by the Commission as essential for both the imple-
mentation  of  the  acquis  and  the  dispersion  of  Structural  Funds 
(Hughes et al., 2000). 
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The Commission’s conditions, as stated in the various Progress Re-
ports  since  2000  (CEC,  2004),  require  Turkey  to  strengthen  its 
structures for managing regional development at two levels: 
 
·  at the central level, either through the SPO or a specific de-
partment given responsibility for regional policy, and  
·  at the regional level, by setting up Regional Development 
Agencies (RDAs). 
 
The requirement to set up NUTS2 regions (territorial units for sta-
tistical classification of regions in the EU) was met in 2002 by the 
establishment of twenty six new statistical regions. The new provi-
sional  NUTS2  regions  group  Turkey’s  eighty  one  provinces  into 
clusters with geographical or economic similarities. However, these 
NUTS2  regions  lack  corresponding  institutional  structures.  Addi-
tionally, Turkey is urged to prepare regional development plans for 
all NUTS2 regions. 
 
The  SPO  prepared  a  Preliminary  National  Development  Plan 
(PNDP, 2003) covering the period 2004-2006 to meet another re-
quirement of the Commission as stated in the Progress Reports. The 
aim of the PNDP is to establish a strategic framework for program-
ming pre-accession financial assistance for Turkey’s economic and 
social cohesion with the EU. 
 
 
4.   Causes and Mechanisms of Stability and Change in Tur-
key’s Regional Governance   
 
In understanding the causes and mechanisms of domestic change 
and stability, research findings from 22 interviews conducted during 
the Summer and Autumn of 2003 are taken into account. Interview-
ees were composed of:  officials in the SPO
7,  the Ministry of Inte-
rior
8,  the GAP Regional Development Administration based in An-
                                                 
7   Two Heads of Department (Department of Regional Development and Struc-
tural Adjustment and Regional Programmes Department), two Planning Ex-
perts, two City and Regional Planners and one Local Administrations Expert. 
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kara
9,  the Ministry of Industry and Trade
10, a former Minister of 
State, the Turkish Union of Architects and Engineers (TMMOB)
11, 
the Middle East Technical University
12, Turkey Technological De-
velopment Foundation (TTGV)
13, the Federation of Sectoral Asso-
ciations (SEDEFED)
14,  the EU Representation to Turkey
15,  DG 
Enlargement of the European Commission
16, and the Economic and 
Social Council (ECOSOC) of the EU
17.   
 
In the selection of interviewees SPO was targeted because it has the 
sole  responsibility  for  regional  policy  and  regional  development 
planning. The other public and non-governmental bodies were tar-
geted  due  to  their  interest  in  regional  development  and  their  in-
volvement in the Special Expert Commission on Regional Devel-
opment, a consultative body which gives its advice to the SPO in 
the preparation of five-year national development plans
18. The EU-
related bodies were targeted due to the EU requirements for mem-
bership. 
 
The interviews were semi-structured in that same questions were 
asked to every interviewee but the latter were completely free in the 
way they answered the questions, which are listed below:  
 
·  What are the reasons for weak regional governance in Tur-
key compared to the larger countries of the EU? 
·  What is the thinking in the SPO on its approach to regional 
economic development and its relationship with regional in-
stitutional capacity? 
                                                 
9   One Director, one Regional Planner, one Social Projects Co-ordinator and one 
Economist. 
10   The Vice-President and a Director in the Small and Medium Sized Enterprises 
Development Organisation (KOSGEB). 
11   Vice-president. 
12   President of Public Administration Institute. 
13   Director. 
14   President. 
15   Regional policy co-ordinator. 
16   Desk-officer. 
17   Rappoteur on regional disparities in Turkey.  
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·  What  is  the  most  important  factor  that  is  responsible  for 
change in regional governance at present time? 
 
‘Unsolicited’ answers of the respondents to the above questions re-
vealed a strong convergence around certain themes. These themes 
help to explain the causes of stability and change in Turkey’s re-
gional governance. 
 
4.1   Norms, Ideas and the EU as causes 
 
Norms 
Nineteen out of 22  respondents referred to “fears of separatism” 
and “the unitary nature of state” in answer to the question asking for 
the reasons of weak regional governance in Turkey compared to the 
larger countries of the EU. It is believed that any stronger form of 
regional governance could provoke regionalist demands for auton-
omy and undermine the unitary nature of state. The below quote 
from  a  SPO  official  reflects  similar  statements  by  most  of  the 
respondents: 
 
‘There is fear of territorial integrity and regional identities aren’t encour-
aged. Regionalism is associated with separatism. It is difficult to have a 
regional identity. It does not exist or very weak. In GAP there is regional 
identity, but this identity played a negative role, as a threat.’ ‘A part of 
the SPO views the problem of decentralisation as connected to the Kurd-
ish problem.’ 
 
Historically the Ottoman-Turkish central authority has been charac-
terised by strong state norms (Heper, 1990). Since the founding of 
the modern Turkish Republic in 1923, a deep commitment to the 
unitary nation-state has been one of the most important ideological 
pillars of the Turkish polity. Obsession of the state elites in Turkey, 
involving not only the military but sections of the political elite and 
the bureaucracy, with a constant fear of the breakdown of the nation 
have led observers to depict the term “Sèvres Syndrome”  to de-
scribe this state of affairs (Öni￿, 2000). The “single-minded empha-
sis” on threats to the unity of the Turkish state (Öni￿, 2000: 478) has 
been the biggest obstacle in the way of change not only in the area 
of regional governance but also in political and economic govern-
ance in general. Loewendahl-Ertugal: Europeanisation of Regional Policy & Governance  34 
 
More than half of the respondents referred to the centralised culture 
in public administration as another reason for weak regional gov-
ernance in Turkey. The centralised nature of governance has led to a 
belief that “the centre knows best”. There is a political culture in 
both the SPO and in the Ministries, particularly those which have 
field organisations, of not wanting to lose the power of decision-
making. In the words of a respondent from the SPO: ‘Because Tur-
key is centralised there is the belief that everything should be from 
the top.’ 
 
Two other factors mentioned by nearly half of the respondents as 
preventing  stronger  regional  governance  are  interrelated:  lack  of 
coordination and provincial administrative structure. While there is 
a need to establish coordination at the regional level, this is pre-
vented  by  the  provincial  administrative  structure  of  Turkey.  The 
Turkish public administration system is basically composed of the 
central government and the local authorities. According to Article 
126 of the (1982) Constitution, in terms of central administrative 
structure, Turkey is divided into provinces; provinces are further di-
vided into lower steps of administrative districts. The central gov-
ernment is comprised of the ministries and their field organisations.  
 
The governing authority for the province is a centrally appointed 
governor. The governors have been mainly responsible for the over-
all  management  and  coordination  of  the  field  directorates  of  the 
central government ministries within their jurisdictional areas. The 
field directorates or administrations of the central Ministries can be 
at the provincial scale or at the regional scale, depending on the 
needs of their particular functions. The practice until present has 
been that various central Ministries have set up regional directorates 
independent of each other with the result that the geographical area 
of regions that these regional directorates (of which there are hun-
dreds) cover do not overlap with each other. Moreover, regional di-
rectorates escape the co-ordination function of provincial governors 
as the former comprise more than one province.  
 
There are, therefore, too many institutions, which are involved in 
decisions related to regional development, especially if one includes 
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with  each  other,  with  no  co-operation  and  coordination  mecha-
nisms, which effectively paralyse the policy-making and implemen-
tation processes (Turkey Development Bank, 2002: 32).  
 
Ideas 
In order to assess the role of ideas, respondents were asked about 
the thinking in the SPO on its approach to regional economic devel-
opment  and  its  relationship  with  regional  institutional  capacity. 
Nearly half of the respondents referred to a recognition in the SPO 
that a degree of regional governance is necessary for the implemen-
tation of regional plans. One respondent from the SPO said:  
 
‘The concept of regional institutions entered Turkey late. A few years ago 
DOKAP [Eastern Black Sea Region Plan] and DAP [Eastern Anatolia 
Plan] started in the SPO. Universities in the region prepared the DAP. 
Projects  were  good,  but  who  would  implement  them? An  institutional 
question.’ 
 
The failure to implement regional plans in the past, for example 
Zonguldak, Antalya and Cukurova plans, and more recently Black 
Sea and Eastern Anatolia region plans, led to a recognition of the 
need for administrative capacity at the regional level. This recogni-
tion in fact dates back to the 1960s when some of the official inter-
nal documents of the SPO (see Eraydın, 1983) suggested setting up 
regional units of the SPO in every region so that regional projects 
could be implemented. This view, however, did not reflect the opin-
ion of every bureaucrat in the SPO. A special report of the SPO in 
1965  questioned  whether  regional  development  plans  is  a  useful 
tool for national economic development and showed the SPO to be 
suspicious about regional planning (SPO, 1965). 
 
Even though the reduction of regional disparities has always been a 
major justification for the existence of the SPO, internal reports of 
the SPO show a lack of consensus on the role of regional planning 
and regional development in this process. Eraydın (1983) points to 
the widespread belief in the SPO in the necessity of preparing the 
country’s development plan at the national level. Tekeli (1972: 150) 
also points to the desire in the SPO to avoid regional planning in 
any way influencing the national plan. It was clear that a dialogue 
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Internal reports of the SPO also showed the absence of a conceptual 
basis for the discussion of regional planning and approaches to re-
gional planning (Eraydın, 1983: 22). 
 
The lack of knowledge on the role of regional planning in reducing 
regional disparities can be related to the sectoral nature of national 
planning,  which  was  mentioned  by  several  of  the  respondents. 
Bringing a regional or spatial dimension to national plans, which 
focus primarily on sectoral targets, is proving to be difficult. 
 
SPO is the co-ordinator in deciding investment budgets, which is 
determined  by  the  SPO,  Treasury  and  the  Ministry  of  Finance. 
There is no coherence between the overall national plan, which is 
based on sectors, and regional development. The difficulty lies in 
linking national plans with regional development plans, in integrat-
ing the sectoral approach with a spatial approach. 
 
Within the SPO there is a complete understanding of this problem 
from a technical point of view and they try to approach it in the cor-
rect way. They realise and are aware that they have to overcome 
this link with the sectoral approach, however, they do not know 
how. For many years various SPO reports (most recently by Dülger, 
2001) pointed out to this problem, but the problem still remains to 
be resolved. 
 
The EU 
In response to the question “what is the most important factor that is 
responsible for change in regional governance at present time”, 20 
of the 22 respondents mentioned the institutional conditions to join 
the EU or in other words the EU acquis.  As one respondent from 
the SPO states: 
 
‘We were forced to conform to the EU, so that is how we give up our power.’ 
‘The EU has triggered change and is forcing us to think globally and to im-
plement locally. 
 
In mentioning the EU as the most important factor, the interviewees 
referred to the establishment of NUTS level regions in Turkey by 
the SPO in 2002, preparation of the Preliminary National Develop-
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prepared by the SPO on establishing RDAs for NUTS2 level re-
gions in response to EU requirements.  
 
In understanding the nature of the impact of the EU on Turkey’s 
central administration in regional governance one consideration is 
the  distinction  drawn  between  “voluntary”  and  “coercive  policy 
transfer” (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; Bache, 2000; Bache and Mar-
shall, 2004). Voluntary policy transfer refers to instances where pol-
icy-makers adopt new policies or practices willingly from another 
country or the EU, mostly due to dissatisfaction with existing poli-
cies and a perceived need for change. Coercive policy transfer, on 
the other hand occurs, when an organisation, such as the EU forces 
a country to adopt different policies or practices. 
 
The impact of EU conditionality on Turkey in respect of regional 
policy and regional governance is an instance of “coercive policy 
transfer” as indicated by the remarks of respondents. Even though 
the existing system has been questioned and the inclusion of local 
levels into the regional policy process has been increasingly viewed 
more positively, the interviews indicated that there is no consensus 
at the central level as to what the role of the regional level should be 
in a more decentralised form of governance. Some of the respon-
dents did not think regionalisation was necessary for regional de-
velopment.  
 
The reason for the identification of EU conditions as the most im-
portant factor behind change is due to the commitment of the cur-
rent government to make Turkey a EU member. The political com-
mitment to meet EU requirements is forcing the bureaucracy, in this 
case the SPO, to consider making changes in the field of regional 
policy.  
 
Turkey’s aspirations to join the EU date back to 1964 when an As-
sociation  Agreement  was  signed  between  the  two
19.  However,  it 
was only in 1999 that Turkey was officially admitted as a candidate 
country. Following the EU’s adoption of the Accession Partnership 
document in 2000, which listed the reforms that Turkey should un-
dertake. Turkey went through three years of divisive debates and re-
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sistance to reforms under a coalition government composed of three 
political parties. By 2002 the reform process had slowed down due 
to the objections of the nationalist right wing partner of the coalition 
government to some of the critical reforms demanded by the EU 
(Avcı, 2003). Their argument was that the EU would never admit 
Turkey as a member and that the aim of the reforms demanded was 
to undermine the territorial integrity of the Turkish state. The ab-
sence of powerful enough political will to pursue reforms weakened 
the government’s ability to mobilise support from the bureaucracy, 
as  manifested  during  the  preparation  of  the  first  National  Pro-
gramme for the Adoption of the Acquis (Kiri￿çi, 2004). 
 
It  was  the  decisive  outcome  of  November  2002  elections  that 
brought in a parliament and a government with a strong will to meet 
EU  criteria  for  membership.  The  Justice  and  Development  Party 
(AKP), a breakaway party from an existing Islamist one, won the 
overwhelming majority of the seats to form a government. As com-
pared to the previous coalition government’s two EU harmonisation 
packages  to  carry  out  legislative  changes,  the  AKP  government, 
since coming to power, adopted five major political reform pack-
ages  to  meet  EU  requirements.  In  2003,  the  AKP  government’s 
Emergency Action Plan (EAP, 2003) and its revised National Pro-
gramme for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA, 2003) promised to 
meet all EU criteria in the field of regional policy, including the es-
tablishment of RDAs. 
 
As to the reasons for the willingness of the AKP government to 
meet EU requirements, there are two key explanations. The first 
reason is the powerful incentive of EU membership, having access 
to the material and social benefits offered by the EU. The 1999 de-
cision brought more certainty to the relationship between carrying 
out reforms and eventual EU membership. The second reason is that 
the aims of EU induced reforms are not incompatible with the ide-
ology of the AKP (Güler, 2003). Coming from an Islamist back-
ground the AKP does not share the same state ideology with the 
military and large sections of the bureaucracy. The military, in par-
ticular, is suspicious of the commitment of the AKP to secularism 
(Kiri￿çi, 2004). Similarly, the AKP does not share the same sensi-
tivities of the state elites about the relationship between decentrali-
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induced reforms further the interests of the AKP by creating a po-
litical environment in which the AKP and their constituents can op-
erate freely without the supervision of the military. 
 
4.2   Mechanisms of Change 
 
In order to understand how various causes in the form of norms, 
ideas and the EU interact and act upon regional governance, either 
in the direction of change or stability, it is important to analyse the 
various mechanisms of institutional change, developed by Lindner 
(2003), in the case of Turkey. 
 
Dominant actor coalition 
The key actors involved in the process of change to regional policy 
during the EU pre-accession process are the government, the SPO 
(which  forms  part  of  the  bureaucracy),  the  Parliament  and  the 
President.  The involvement of the latter two takes place when leg-
islative change is required in adopting EU conditions. 
 
Change is triggered by the willingness and commitment of the gov-
ernment to meeting EU requirements, which in turn forces the SPO, 
in the case of regional governance, to undertake the necessary work. 
When the required change is directly within the responsibilities of 
the SPO, such as the formulation of a national regional development 
strategy  in  the  Preliminary  National  Development  Plan,  then  the 
SPO  is  fully  in  charge  of  this  process.  Similarly,  it  is  the  SPO, 
which makes the necessary arrangements to ensure the involvement 
of local actors in the preparation of regional plans. 
 
In other cases, such as the establishment of statistical regions, other 
bureaucracies may be involved, the decision of which has to be ap-
proved by the Council of Ministers. It was the SPO and the State In-
stitute of Statistics, which together determined the NUTS regions in 
Turkey. The map of regions was approved by the Council of Minis-
ters, which forms the core of the government. 
 
When the change concerned has far-reaching institutional implica-
tions, such as the establishment of RDAs, then legislative change is 
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dent. In establishing RDAs, it is the SPO, in consultation with other 
Ministries, which is preparing the draft law. It is this draft law pre-
pared by the SPO and approved by Ministers that will be debated in 
the Parliament. 
 
The procedure for becoming law is that the Parliament has to accept 
it with a simple majority, which the current government can com-
fortably meet with its seats in the Parliament. Once the Parliament 
approves then the draft law requires the approval of the President.  
 
The President can accept it, in which case the draft becomes law. 
However, if the President rejects the draft law, then there are two al-
ternatives. Either Parliament accepts the draft for the second time 
without changes and returns it to the President, who then has to ac-
cept it. The draft becomes law, however, the President, then, can 
apply  to  the  Constitutional  Court,  challenging  the  new  law  on 
grounds that it is against the Constitution. In that case, the final de-
cision rests with the Constitutional Court. Constitutional changes in 
the Parliament, in turn, require three-fifths majority approval. 
 
Alternatively, the Parliament can make changes to the draft law in 
the  second  round  in  accordance  with  the  reasons  stated  by  the 
President in his rejection. In that case, the draft law accepted by the 
Parliament is considered as a new one, and therefore the President 
can refuse it once more and return it to the Parliament.  
 
In this procedure, the President can therefore delay the process of 
change substantially or even block it for a period if he goes to the 
Constitutional Court and the Court rules in his favour, necessitating 
constitutional change. Whether the President shares the same state 
ideology with the military and large sections of the political elite 
and the bureaucracy, thus, gains importance in order to understand 
the future pace of change in relation to regional governance. 
 
Turkey’s current President was elected by the previous Parliament 
in 2000 for a term of seven years. Having served previously as the 
Head of Turkey’s Constitutional Court, he shares the fundamental 
values of the state ideology. The most recent evidence of this can be 
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a draft law, which was approved by the Parliament in the summer of 
2004
20.  
 
The draft law in question aimed at decentralisation to the local level 
by  transferring  powers  from  the  provincial  governors,  who  form 
part of the central administration, to Special Provincial Administra-
tions, which are elected local governments. The President in his jus-
tification listed the following reasons for his veto: that Turkey is a 
unitary state according to the Constitution, which requires a central-
ised structure; that subsidiarity, which the draft law aims to intro-
duce, is therefore against Turkey’s Constitution and is incompatible 
with a unitary state; and that the unity of the nation and the secular 
nature of state require centralised planning, programming and im-
plementation. 
 
Although not submitted to the Parliament yet, it can be reasonably 
expected that the establishment of RDAs may be delayed or rejected 
on similar grounds. Most importantly, RDA type structures are not 
defined in Turkey’s Constitution (Güler, 2003) and therefore may 
require constitutional changes
21. 
 
Interdependence between policy sub-fields 
One of the main responsibilities of the SPO is to co-ordinate the in-
vestments of the central Ministries and their related institutions with 
the aim of reducing regional disparities. In the performance of this 
function, the SPO does not constitute a higher level of authority, but 
has an equal status to the other Ministries. Therefore, the SPO can-
not force these institutions. 
 
Interviews with the GAP Administration, in particular, emphasised 
that the Ministries and their related institutions, such as the High-
ways Authority or the State Hydraulic Works, have their own budg-
ets, which they themselves decide to spend. These decisions do not 
always  take  regional  disparities  into  consideration  particularly  as 
the national plan has a sectoral approach. Additionally, interviews 
with the SPO pointed to the conservative nature of the bureaucracy 
                                                 
20   Available in Turkish at http://www.cankaya.gov.tr  
21   Interview with the General Director of the General Directorate of Local Au-
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whereby the “Ministries do not want to lose their own power in 
providing services”. The SPO has thus proved not to perform its co-
ordination function effectively as the EU’s progress reports pointed 
(CEC, 2003). 
 
However, governmental intervention can overrule the interdepend-
ence between policy-fields and the entrenched interests within them 
due to the superior hierarchical political authority of the govern-
ment above that of the Ministerial bureaucracies -. In fact, the gov-
ernment’s commitment to reform, particularly in public administra-
tion and local government
22, has implications for overcoming the 
interdependency of policy-fields. According to the proposals for re-
form
23, some of which have become law, but some others still wait-
ing, most of the field organisations of the central Ministries will be 
transferred to local authorities, either to Special Provincial Admini-
strations or to municipalities. Thus, most of the public investments 
and services provided by the central Ministries until now will be 
provided by the local authorities. The implication is that if these 
proposals are finally accepted, the SPO will be less constrained by 
other Ministries in introducing changes to regional policy. 
 
Large switching costs 
The costs associated with switching from a centralised to a regional-
ised institutional structure would have been very high for the domi-
nant actor coalition in the 1990s at the height of the violence sur-
rounding the Kurdish  question in the Southeast of Turkey accom-
panied with a deterioration of human rights
24. Since then the vio-
lence  ended  with  the  capture  and  trial  of  Abdullah  Öcalan,  the 
leader of the separatist Kurdish organisation, the Kurdistan’s Work-
ers Party (PKK), at the end of the 1990s. 
 
                                                 
22   Public sector reform in Turkey is driven, to a large extent, by the conditions 
imposed by the IMF stand-by agreements and the World Bank structural ad-
justment loans, which are similar to and compatible with EU requirements 
(see Güler, 2003). These conditions require, among others, decentralisation in 
general, without making a reference to the regional level or to regionalisation. 
23   The Draft Framework Law on Public Administration is available in Turkish at 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr  
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Even though costs are lower today than in the past, they are still 
high enough to obstruct change for actors who share the belief that 
regionalisation is dangerous for the country’s territorial integrity. 
The political conditions of the EU as stated in Copenhagen criteria 
are seen as specifically promoting separatism in Turkey by being 
forced to recognise Kurds as a minority. One respondent from the 
SPO said:  
 
‘The EU has prejudices. They always look at the issue of regional de-
velopment and regional governance from a Kurdish point of view. They 
do not understand that Kurds are not a minority.’ 
 
Another reason for large switching costs is that it entails loss of 
power from the SPO to regional and local levels in the preparation 
and implementation of regional plans. Interviews revealed a resis-
tance in the SPO to delegating resources to the local level. 
 
On the other hand, the opportunity costs of staying on the same 
path, i.e. centralised governance system, are rising as political pri-
orities change and the prospects for EU membership increase with 
the recognition of Turkey as a candidate country. As a result, a cer-
tain degree of policy change has already taken place where adapta-
tional costs are lower. For example, policies were re-oriented to-
wards supply-side measures such as SME support, training, private 
initiatives and NGOs in the preparation of regional plans (PNDP, 
2003). Similarly, the establishment of NUTS level regions was pre-
dominantly a statistical exercise. 
 
However, for further institutional change to take place the opportu-
nity costs have to rise further, by the starting of accession negotia-
tions between Turkey and the EU. Interviews show that there are 
doubts about the intentions of the EU towards Turkey. Respondents 
from the SPO stated: 
 
‘Bureaucrats in the SPO think that Turkey won’t join the EU anyway, 
and so wonder what the point or need for these changes are.’ 
 
Similarly, the preliminary National Development Plan (PNDP, 
2003) clearly states that further progress on developing a na-
tional regional development strategy as demanded by the EU is 
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Another way in which opportunity costs might increase is through 
ideational  change  whereby  domestic  policy-makers  “learn”  from 
EU policies that regional governance is important for regional de-
velopment. As a result of such learning, the perception of continu-
ing in the existing institutional path may be seen as increasingly 
costly. Interviews show that the technical assistance provided by the 
EU may lead to “experiential learning” (Olsen, 2002) in Turkey in 
time.  It was stated in an interview with the SPO:  
 
‘If aid instruments are open to Turkey, then it is possible that people 
may be socialised. Mentalities may change through mutual interaction.’ 
 
Ideational change is taking place in certain regions of Turkey, in 
particular in the Aegean region25. This has led to the formation of 
an informal Regional Development Agency for the Aegean region 
through  a  bottom-up  process  based  on  co-operation  between  the 
private  sector,  local  authorities  and  NGOs.  Bottom-up  ideational 
change among regional and local actors may, thus, filter up or at 
least meet half-way the partial top-down change of the central ad-
ministration. 
 
Small institutional adaptations 
As the initiator of change under the political direction of the gov-
ernment,  the  SPO  has  been  accommodating  pressure  for  change 
through small institutional alterations. In reference to the establish-
ment of RDAs, a respondent from an NGO said: “The SPO is trying 
to get away without a major accident”.  
 
The SPO prepared two draft laws on establishing RDAs for NUTS2 
level regions in Turkey (SPO, 2003a, 2003b). In both of the drafts 
RDAs are envisaged as structures, which institute co-operation be-
tween the local authorities (Special Provincial Administrations and 
municipalities), the private sector and the NGOs, under the leader-
ship of provincial governors. This kind of arrangement is different 
from creating a dedicated, separate, layer of regional institutional 
structure,  as  was  indicated  in  the  EU’s  progress  reports  (CEC, 
2003). 
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The draft laws on establishing RDAs give the impression that they 
are being created only for the purpose of administering EU funds, 
carefully avoiding to disrupt Turkey’s traditional centre-local gov-
ernment structure. RDAs are not envisaged to constitute a separate 
layer  of  dedicated  structures  for  regional  development  purposes. 
The members, most important of which are governors, provincial 
administrations  and  municipalities,  are  expected  to  perform  their 
RDA related duties in addition to their existing ones.  
 
The  SPO’s  strategy  of  small  institutional  adaptation  at  the  same 
time incurs lower switching costs as the changes foreseen are more 
compatible with the existing institutional structure. It is when these 
small changes fail to meet EU requirements and to ease the pressure 
for change that “off-path” institutional changes are likely to take 
place (Lindner, 2003: 919). 
 
 
5.   Conclusions 
 
The most important causes which act upon the development of re-
gional governance at the national level in Turkey can be explained 
in terms of institutional norms, ideas, and external forces. While EU 
conditionality is found to be the most important external force driv-
ing  change  in  regional  governance,  norms  and  ideas  prevailing 
within the bureaucracy, in particular the SPO, act as counter forces 
obstructing change. The reason for the greater influence of the EU 
since the end of 2002 lies in the commitment and willingness of the 
current Turkish government to fulfilling the EU criteria for mem-
bership, which is putting pressure on the national bureaucracy to 
undertake the necessary reforms.  
 
According  to  the  research  findings,  regional  governance  and  re-
gionalisation are strongly associated with regional separatism and 
demands for political autonomy in Turkey. Due to the norm of terri-
torial integrity regionalism is seen as a threat. There is a tendency of 
state elites in Turkey, therefore, to put economic and political re-
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about economic development and about stronger administrative ca-
pacity
26.  
Research findings have also shown a strong central planning tradi-
tion, whereby all decisions are taken by the centre because it is be-
lieved to “know best”. The strong centralised tradition creates the 
fear that this power can be lost if authority is devolved to the re-
gions, even though the main motive for devolving power to the re-
gions in Western Europe has been most of the time to enhance the 
capacity of the national level and is a project of the nation-state. 
 
In terms of ideas, the research revealed that while regional govern-
ance is seen as useful for abolishing regional disparities and for re-
source allocation between regions, there are no clear ideas about 
what kind of a role regional planning and development should play 
in national development or even about the usefulness of regional 
planning. National planning, which in Turkey is sectoral in nature, 
is seen as more important. Lack of ideas about regional planning 
has prevented the formation of suitable institutional structures and 
capacity at the regional level. Under EU influence, it seems that 
there is an opportunity for the central administration to learn from 
the practices of the EU countries, especially through EU technical 
assistance. 
 
An explanation of institutional change/stability in Turkey’s regional 
governance is not complete without an account of the mechanisms 
of change. While the full influence of the EU on domestic change in 
Turkey is still being observed and will depend on whether EU ac-
cession negotiations start, it is possible to make an initial assess-
ment of the mechanisms of institutional change/stability using the 
framework  developed  by  Lindner  (2003).  These  various  mecha-
nisms of institutional change point to the ways in which norms, 
ideas and the EU interact and lead to institutional change/stability 
in Turkey’s regional governance. 
 
If it was not for EU conditionality, the current process of domestic 
change in Turkey in respect of regional policy and regional gov-
ernance is very unlikely to have taken place in the absence of “pol-
                                                 
26   But in certain cases political regionalisations support greater administrative 
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icy learning”. The main reason is not only the strong influence of 
state norms, which has blocked institutional change, but also the 
lack of sufficient knowledge and ideas about the relationship be-
tween  regional  economic  development  and  regional  governance. 
However, it can also be claimed that ideas are changing, and espe-
cially  under  EU  influence  experiential  learning  may  take  place. 
The various mechanisms of institutional change indicate that as EU 
conditionality  and  changing  ideas  increasingly  challenge  deep-
rooted state norms in Turkey the prospects for institutional change 
are high. 
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